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INTRODUCTION 
In its current yet to be ratified form,1 the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), negotiated under general secrecy 
among a self-selected group of countries,2 proposes to allow 
 
 *  Professor, Northeastern University School of Law; Honorary Research 
Fellow, University of KwaZulu Natal; Health GAP Policy Analyst. 
 1. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA 
Text―Dec. 3, 2010], available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/Final-ACTA-
text-following-legal-verification.pdf. The ACTA text has undergone a series of 
revisions as it approached finalization. The most current version, dated December 
3, 2010, is the result of final textual scrubbing following legal verification. An 
earlier version, subtitled “Subject to Legal Review,” was dated November 15, 
2010. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Subject to Legal Review, Nov. 
15, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft―Nov. 15, 2010], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2379. The first quasi-official text was titled 
“Consolidated Text—Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Informal 
Predecisional/ Deliberative Draft.” See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: 
Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, Oct. 2, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA 
Draft―Oct. 2, 2010], available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2338 
(reflecting changes made during the September 2010 Tokyo Round, which 
included changes to both Section 3 and Section 5 of Chapter 2). 
 2. See Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of 
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preliminary and final injunctive relief against third parties (“third-
party enforcement”) to prevent infringement of intellectual property 
(“IP”) rights and/or to prevent infringing goods from entering into 
the channels of commerce.3 After a behind-the-scenes battle, the 
relevant civil enforcement and injunction section of ACTA no longer 
applies automatically to the entire range of IP rights4 covered by the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS Agreement”),5 but rather permits parties to exclude patents 
and undisclosed data,6 as proposed by the U.S.7 Similarly and more 
effectively, there is an absolute exclusion of patents from the border 
enforcement section.8 Even though patents may be excluded from 
civil enforcement measures and are definitely excluded from border 
measures, the health risks in ACTA have not been eliminated. In the 
context of access to medicines, new globalized forms of third-party 
enforcement, like its draft predecessor, intermediary service provider 
 
the U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through 
Executive Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 24, 26-27 (2009), 
http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-35-katz-hinze-ACTA-on-knowledge-economy.pdf 
(stating “[o]n October 23, 2007, the United States, the European Community, 
Switzerland and Japan simultaneously announced” that they would negotiate a new 
intellectual property enforcement treaty). Australia, the Republic of Korea, New 
Zealand, Mexico, Jordan, Morocco, Singapore, and Canada have joined the 
negotiations. Id. 
 3. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 8, 12; infra Part I. 
 4. See ACTA Draft―Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 1, art. 1.X (indicating 
“intellectual property means all categories of intellectual property that are the 
subject of Sections 1 though 7 of Part II of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”). Those sections cover: copyrights and 
related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, 
layouts (topographies) of integrated circuits, and protection of undisclosed 
information. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, pts. II:1-7, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 5. TRIPS pt. II. 
 6. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 7 n.2 (“A Party may 
exclude patents and protection of undisclosed information from the scope of this 
Section.”) (emphasis added). 
 7. See ACTA Draft―Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 1, art. 2.1 n.2 (noting the 
United States chose to exclude patents from Section 2). 
 8. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 13 n.6 (stating “the 
Parties agree that patents and protection of undisclosed information do not fall 
within the scope” of the Border Measures section) (emphasis added). 
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enforcement,9 poses unprecedented risks to the lawful trade of 
generic medicines. Extending third-party enforcement and imposing 
provisional measures and permanent injunctions could interfere with 
the goals of robust generic competition and access to medicine when 
applied against (1) innocent active pharmaceutical ingredient 
(“API”) suppliers whose materials are used in the manufacturing of 
patent infringing medicines or in mislabeled products without their 
knowledge, (2) transporters who use international channels of 
commerce through countries where the “patent manufacturing 
fiction” or “trademark confusion” claims might apply, and (3) other 
actors in the global procurement, supply, and even registration of 
medicines. Under the risk of injunctions and contempt of court 
penalties, API and other suppliers would predictably shy away from 
selling base ingredients to generic producers. Likewise, entities like 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (“Global 
Fund”) and the U.S. PEPFAR Supply Chain Management System 
(“SCMS”) could be deterred from funding the purchase of generic 
medicines, and shippers might refuse to transport finished generic 
medicines through ordinary transshipment routes involving ACTA 
signatories. These threats to access to medicines remain to be 
addressed by a global coalition of AIDS, health, and trade activists. 
I. ACTA’S KEY PROVISIONS: MOVEMENT FROM 
INTERMEDIARY TO THIRD-PARTY 
ENFORCEMENT 
The Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, dated April 2010 (“April 
Predecisional Draft”),10 contained multiple threats to access to 
medicines. The most widely discussed issue involved the seizure of 
goods-in-transit following the detention of multiple drug shipments 
by Dutch customs authorities in 2008 and 2009,11 under the authority 
 
9. The concept of intermediary service provider, discussed further, infra Part I, 
applies not to entities that directly infringe IP rights but rather those entities that 
provide services that contributed to the creation and distribution of an IP infringing 
product. 
 10. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: PUBLIC Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft, Apr. 21, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft―Apr. 21, 2010], available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf. 
 11. See EC Customs Law, TPA CUSTOMS NEWSLETTER (TPA Global, 
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of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003.12 Dutch authorities 
applied the judicially-created rule that the IP status of in-transit 
medicines should be judged under the fiction that the medicines had 
been manufactured in the Netherlands.13 The authorities thus 
responded to Big Pharma seizure requests by impounding and 
delaying shipments of life-saving medicines sent from India, where 
they had been lawfully manufactured and exported, to countries in 
Africa and Latin America, where they would have been lawfully 
imported, marketed, and consumed. These seizures and the European 
Union’s delayed and defensive response to expressions of diplomatic 
and human rights concern prompted India and Brazil to initiate 
dispute resolution procedures at the World Trade Organization.14 
 
Amsterdam, Neth.), Nov. 2009, at 2, available at http://www.tpa-global.com/ 
PDF/Publications/011109_TPA-Customs_Newsletter.pdf (summarizing an 
incident on December 4, 2008, where Dutch authorities seized an air shipment of 
generic medicine on suspicion that it was counterfeit, and held it for thirty-six 
days). 
 12. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7 (EC) (outlining a 
policy in the European Union that customs action can be taken against goods that 
are suspected of violating intellectual property rights). 
 13. The fiction that the product was manufactured in the Netherlands, despite 
having been actually produced elsewhere, permits Dutch authorities to apply and 
enforce a product’s territorial patent status in the Netherlands despite the fact that 
the product is not intended for commercialization there.  See Frederick M. Abbott, 
Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of Patent 
Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public Welfare, 1 
WIPO J. 43, 43 (2009) (noting that the European Union’s amended border control 
regulations gave permission to E.U. patent holders to demand seizure of goods 
such as medicines in transit); cf. Sosecal v. Sisvel, Rechtbanks-Gravenhage 
[District Court in The Hague], July 18, 2008, 311378/KG ZA 08-617 (Neth.) 
(discussing the manufacturing fiction with regard to a shipment of MP4 players); 
Frank Eijsvogels, Sisel v. Sosecal: Acting Against Transit Goods Still Possible 
Under the Anti Piracy Regulation in the Netherlands, IP INTELLIGENCE EUR. 
(Howrey L.L.P., Amsterdam, Neth.), Autumn 2008, at 10 (stating that under Sisvel, 
transit goods may be detained as may be goods intended for the country that serves 
as their point of entry into the European Union). 
 14. See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS408, European Union and a Member 
State [India] -- Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm (last updated 
June 22, 2010) (relaying the initiation of consultations by India with the European 
Union and the Netherlands regarding repeated seizures on the basis of patent 
infringement); Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS409, European Union and a 
Member State [Brazil] -- Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409 _e.htm (last 
updated June 22, 2010) (reporting that Brazil requested consultations with the 
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Unfortunately, the risks of the April Predecisional Draft to public 
health and to the lawful international trade of generic medicines were 
not limited to border-seizures by customs agents policing phantom 
patent rights. A risk also arose from provisions that subjected so-
called “intermediaries” to interlocutory and permanent injunctions, 
known elsewhere as interdicts. The use of such injunctions against 
API manufacturers, international shippers, and other participants in 
the global trade of medicines could inhibit supply and distribution 
systems and thereby deter generic entry, robust generic competition, 
and legitimate international trade of generic medicines of assured 
quality, especially if the civil enforcement provisions were to extend 
to all IP rights as proposed by some negotiators, including the 
European Community.15 
Bracketed Article 2.X.2 provided: “The Parties [may] shall ensure 
that right holders are in a position to apply for an injunction against 
[infringing] intermediaries whose services are used by a third party 
to infringe an intellectual property right.”16 Footnote 8 stated that the 
“conditions and procedures relating to such injunction will be left to 
each Party’s legal system.”17 Similarly, bracketed Article 2.5.X 
provided that “[a]n interlocutory injunction may also be issued, 
under the same conditions {to prevent any imminent infringement of 
an intellectual property right}, against any [infringing] intermediary 
whose services are being used by a third party to infringe an 
intellectual property right.”18 The parties left undecided whether the 
provision of injunctions against intermediaries would be mandatory 
 
European Union regarding the repeated seizure of generic drugs originating in 
India); see also India, Brazil Raise Dispute Over EU Drug Seizures, SUNS, May 
17, 2010, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo 
100509.htm; Kaitlin Mara, Consultations on WTO Drug Transit Case Continue, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 16, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/ 
weblog/2010/09/16/consultations-on-wtocase-on-drugs-in-transit-continue/; C.H. 
Unnikrishnan, India May Move WTO as It Seeks to Resolve EU Dispute, LIVEMINT 
(Oct. 11, 2010, 10:54 PM), http://www.livemint.com/2010/10/1122 5420/India-
may-move-WTO-as-it-seeks.html. 
 15. See ACTA Draft―Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.1 (containing 
alternative coverage proposals revealing a disagreement over whether the section 
should apply to all intellectual property rights, or only copyrights and related rights 
and trademarks). 
 16. Id. art. 2.X.2. 
 17. Id. art. 2.X n.8. 
 18. Id. art. 2.5.X. 
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or permissive. In either event, there would have been an in terrorem 
effect. A related concept to intermediary enforcement was the 
proposed criminal responsibility of persons or entities that incite, aid, 
or abet cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or 
related rights piracy on a commercial scale.19 Enforcement against 
intermediaries would have been facilitated by proposed Article 2.4, 
which allowed broad discovery of intermediary activities, 
particularly those involving production and distribution, during civil 
enforcement procedures against alleged infringers.20  
The April Predecisional Draft left undefined the key operative 
term, “intermediaries,” as well as the alternative term, “infringing 
intermediary.” Likewise, what constituted “services” used by another 
to infringe an IP right was also unclear. Previously, the concept 
“intermediary services” had been analyzed most closely with respect 
to internet service providers (“ISPs”).21 In those circumstances, an 
ISP that merely provided facilities used by others for infringement, 
i.e. to download a digital copy of a song, book or movie, might be 
 
 19. Id. art. 2.15.2. 
 20. Id. art. 2.4. 
Without prejudice to other statutory provisions which, in particular, govern the 
protection of confidentiality of information sources or the processing of personal data, 
Each Party shall provide that in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement 
of [intellectual property rights and copyright or related rights and trademarks], its 
judicial authorities shall have the authority upon a justified request of the right holder, 
to order the [alleged] infringer [including an alleged infringer] to provide, [for the 
purpose of collecting evidence] any [relevant] information [information on the origin 
and distribution network of the infringing goods or services][in the form as prescribed 
in its applicable laws and regulations] that the infringer possesses or controls, [where 
appropriate,] to the right holder or to the judicial authorities. Such information may 
include information regarding any person or persons involved in any aspect of the 
infringement and regarding the means of production or distribution channel of such 
goods or services, including the identification of third persons involved in the 
production and distribution of the infringing goods or services or in their channels of 
distribution. [For greater clarity, this provision does not apply to the extent that it 
would conflict with common law or statutory privileges, such as legal professional 
privilege]. 
Id. 
 21. ACTA Ultra-Lite: The U.S. Cave on the Internet Chapter Complete, 
MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/ 
5352/125/ (noting these concerns have not been completely eliminated in the new 
ACTA text in part because the United States, who was initially in favor of tough 
liability provisions for intermediaries, decided only recently to “cave” on their 
insistence of such provisions). 
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interdicted. Given the lack of definition, access-to-knowledge 
activists were concerned that the terms “intermediaries” or 
“infringing intermediaries” might not only be applied to ISPs but 
might also be extended to libraries, cultural institutions, and 
educational institutions. However, their application to mail or 
telecommunications providers had been deemed unlikely.22 Internet 
and copyright activists were also concerned that providing for 
injunctions might create incentives for ISPs and other intermediaries 
to take on new roles as extra-judicial enforcement arms of the courts 
and, most especially, of rights holders.  
In part because of health activist concern over the impact of 
intermediary enforcement on access to medicines and because of a 
lack of clarity about the territorial reach of injunctive powers,23 the 
parties dropped the intermediary language in the first quasi-official 
text, the Consolidated Text—Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
Informal Predecisional/ Deliberative Draft, dated October 2, 2010,24 
and instead introduced the concept of third-party enforcement in its 
place. Pursuant to the revised Civil Enforcement—Provisional 
Measures section: 
 
 22. See Kimberlee Weatherall, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: 
Analysis of the January Consolidated Text 18 (Apr. 2010), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=kimweathera
ll (suggesting that it would be utterly unprecedented to apply the terms 
“intermediaries” or “infringing intermediaries” to mail service and 
telecommunications companies). 
 23. See Text of Urgent ACTA Communique: International Experts Find that 
Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests, AM. U. 
WASH. C. L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Jun. 23, 2010), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique (identifying the threat to 
access to medicines by the intermediary liability language of the April 
Predecisional Draft of ACTA, which included expanding the scope of the 
agreement to include patents and limiting key flexibilities on injunctions); see also 
ACTA - People Before Profits!, AVAAZ, http://www.avaaz.org/en/acta (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2011) (calling for transparency in the ACTA negotiations spurred by 
mounting concern over denial of access to life-saving generic medicines); Berkeley 
Declaration on Intellectual Property Enforcement and Access to Medicines, 
BERKELEY L. SCH. (Jul. 15, 2010), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ 
Berkeley_Declaration.pdf (discussing the negative impact ACTA would have on 
the supply of generic medicines and emphasizing that restricting generic medicines 
disrupts competition and makes it difficult for those with limited resources to 
access important medicines). 
24.  ACTA Draft―Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 1. 
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Each Party shall provide that its judicial authorities shall have the 
authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures: against a 
party, or where appropriate, against a third party over whom the relevant 
judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to prevent an infringement of any 
intellectual property rights from occurring, and in particular to prevent 
infringing goods from entering into the channels of commerce.25 
Likewise, with respect to its Civil Enforcement Injunctions 
section: 
Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities shall 
have the authority to issue an order against a party to desist from an 
infringement, and inter alia, an order to that party or, where appropriate, 
to a third party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises 
jurisdiction, to prevent infringing goods from entering into the channels 
of commerce.26 
This language concerning third-party enforcement was present in 
the penultimate draft27 and final ACTA text.28  
Adoption of third-party enforcement exceeds TRIPS protocol, or 
is “TRIPS-plus,” because no comparable provisions in TRIPS 
addresses injunctions for established violations and provisional 
measures for threatened infringements.29 Under TRIPS Article 44, 
members are not obligated to allow for injunctions against persons 
who acquire or order protected subject matter without having known 
or having had reason to know that they were dealing in infringing 
products.30 However, there is an obligation under TRIPS Article 47 
to provide information about “the identity of third persons involved 
in the production and distribution of the infringing goods or services 
and of their channels of distribution.”31 Article 50 permits 
provisional measures to prevent the infringement of IP rights and to 
 
 25. Id. art. 2.5(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. art. 2.X.1 (emphasis added). 
 27. ACTA Draft―Nov. 15, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 2.5:1(a), 2.X.1. 
 28. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 12:1(a), 8:1. 
 29. See TRIPS arts. 44, 50. 
 30. See id. art. 44.1 (“Members are not obligated to accord such authority in 
respect of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a person prior to 
knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such subject matter 
would entail the infringement of an intellectual property right.”). 
 31. Id. art. 47. 
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prevent the entry of infringing products, but like Article 44, it does 
not directly address enforcement against third parties.32  
The necessity of having personal and territorial jurisdiction over a 
third party is at least referenced by the final ACTA text,33 but ACTA 
introduced an additional confusing phrase―“entering into the 
channels of commerce.” TRIPS had previously referenced “channels 
of commerce” in its enforcement provisions, but clarified the concept 
considerably by limiting it to goods that had entered commercial 
channels within the territory of the enforcing country.34 By now 
extending this concept beyond such territory, ACTA is not only 
TRIPS-plus, but it also introduces substantial ambiguity about the 
length, depth, and width of the channels of commerce.35 
 
 32. See id. art. 50 (failing to directly address third parties in the “Provisional 
Measures” article). 
 33. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 12:1(a). Injunctions are 
usually limited in their application to activities occurring within the geographic 
territory of the issuing jurisdiction, but jurisdiction sometimes extends to 
extraterritorial activities that adversely impact in-territory interests. Under a strict 
territorial rule, to enjoin third-party enablement of IP infringement in India, first 
the third party would have to be facilitating an infringement of a territorial IP right 
in India, and second, the injunction would have to be issued in India against the 
importation, manufacturing, or export of the third-party-provided service or 
materials. However, if more expansive extra-territorial jurisdiction applied, the 
transit country could issue an injunction against the third party’s activities in other 
countries to the extent that those activities had or would predictably impact in-
territory events. In such circumstances, a third party might be enjoined in the 
Netherlands for supplying APIs to an infringing generic manufacturer in India that 
had or intended to transship through the Netherlands. See AM. L. INST., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, 
AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008). A full discussion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is clearly beyond the scope of this short article, but for a 
discussion of some of the relevant principles, see generally id. 
 34. See TRIPS art. 44(1) (“The judicial authorities shall have the authority to 
order a party to desist from an infringement . . . to prevent the entry into the 
channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the 
infringement of an intellectual property right, immediately after customs clearance 
of such goods.”).  
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and effective 
provisional measures: (a) to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right 
from occurring, and in particular to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in 
their jurisdiction of goods, including imported goods immediately after customs 
clearance. 
Id. art. 50(1)(a). 
 35. See infra Part II (describing the risk faced by distributors and transporters 
of generic medicine due to the ambiguity of ACTA’s third-party enforcement 
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An additional incoherence in the ACTA text is that provisional 
measures can be used to address any IP infringement but final 
injunctions are limited solely to preventing infringing goods from 
entering into channels of commerce. Paradoxically, provisional 
measures might be used to temporarily enjoin production, before full 
commercialization, but final injunctions might not be able do so.36  
In service of third-party enforcement, all the relevant drafts of 
ACTA have required production of information “regarding any 
person involved in any aspect of the infringement . . . and regarding 
the means of production or the channels of distribution of the 
infringing or allegedly infringing goods or services.”37 This language 
is in substantial conformity with TRIPS.38 With respect to criminal 
enforcement, the parties modified the April Predecisional Draft 
provision to exclude incitement and instead require that each “[p]arty 
shall ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available 
under its law.”39  
Although the final ACTA text clearly elected to focus IP 
enforcement on third parties rather than intermediary service 
providers, the next section addresses both concepts because of the 
dangers each poses to access to medicines. 
II. APPLYING INTERMEDIARY AND NOW THIRD-
PARTY ENFORCEMENT TO PHARMACEUTICALS 
In the context of access to medicines, the concept “intermediary 
services” may be quite ominous. Services are obviously provided by 
ISPs―allowing suppliers to market medicines online―and, in the 
pharmaceutical context, by shipping agents.40 However, lawyers and 
accountants, communications service providers, and factory workers 
 
concept). 
 36. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, arts. 8, 12 (providing, in Article 
12, that provisional measures may be taken against a party or third party to prevent 
an infringement of any intellectual property right, including to prevent goods from 
entering channels of commerce, while Article 8 provides for final injunctions 
against any goods that infringe upon intellectual property rights from entering into 
the channels of commerce). 
 37. E.g., id. art. 11. 
 38. See TRIPS art. 47 (allowing judicial authorities “to order the infringer to 
inform the right holder of the identity of third persons involved in the production 
and distribution of infringing goods or services”). 
 39. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 23.4. 
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also supply services. Although one does not usually consider 
suppliers of components—for example, API and inert ingredient 
suppliers—to be providing a “service,” if components are deemed to 
be services, then all medicine component suppliers could be deemed 
“intermediaries” who contributed services instantiated in the 
manufacture and distribution of an IP-infringing generic medicine, 
and would therefore be subject to an injunction and perhaps even an 
order of destruction.41  
Perhaps more ominously, many others who helped fund or 
facilitate purchases of generic drugs as they moved through the 
stream of international commerce from producer to consumer could 
face intermediary liability. For example, the Global Fund solicits and 
funds country-led proposals for funding priority disease prevention, 
treatment, and care.42 More to the point, the Global Fund now 
provides a voluntary pooled-procurement service for medicines43 and 
 
 40. See Thomas Schachl, German Federal Supreme Court Confirms Broad 
Responsibility of Forwarding Agents for Handled Goods; Increased Requirements 
to Examine Compliance of Handled Goods With German Patent Law, BARDEHLE 
PAGENBERG IP REP. (Düsseldorf, Ger.), 2010/I, at 6, available at 
http://www.bardehle.com/uploads/files/IP_Report_2010_I.pdf (summarizing a 
German Court ruling granting injunctive relief against a shipping agent who 
delivered allegedly patent infringing MP3 players); see also Trade Enforcement 
Act of 2009, S. 1466, 111th Cong. § 223(2)(C)-(D) (2009) (providing for 
disclosure of identities and contact information of parties involved in shipments of 
infringing goods); Customs Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Reauthorization 
Act of 2009, S. 1631, 111th Cong. § 234(a)-(d) (2009) (supporting the inference 
that the enforcement agenda seeks to disrupt each and every link in the distribution 
chain); ACTA Draft―Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.4 (allowing 
intermediary liability to extend to shippers by including a direct reference to 
distribution and channels of distribution). 
 41. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 10(2) (arguably 
permitting the destruction of APIs used in the “manufacture” of “infringing” 
generic medicines).  
Each Party shall further provide that its judicial authorities have the authority to order 
that materials and implements, the predominant use of which has been in the 
manufacture or creation of such infringing goods, be, without undue delay and without 
compensation of any sort, destroyed or disposed of outside the channels of commerce 
in such a manner as to minimize the risks of further infringements. 
Id. 
 42. See About the Global Fund, GLOBAL FUND, http://www.theglobalfund.org/ 
en/about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (describing the organization’s mission of 
preventing and treating diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria). 
 43. See E.D. Report Provides Updates on CCMs, Round 8 Grants, Other 
Topics, GLOBAL FUND OBSERVER (Aidspan, Nairobi, Kenya), Jun. 24, 2010, at 13-
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maintains tight control over purchases of particular tuberculosis and 
malaria medicines.44 Will the Global Fund—and similar 
funding/facilitating services such as those offered by UNITAID,45 the 
Clinton Health Access Initiative,46 SCMS,47 IDA Foundation,48 
Médecins Sans Frontières,49 and even UNICEF50—fear that their 
 
14, available at http://www.aidspan.org/ documents/gfo/GFO-Issue-127.pdf. 
[Principal Recipients] from 37 countries . . . have joined the Voluntary Pooled 
Procurement (VPP) system. Discussions are ongoing with PRs from another 20 
countries. The VPP has now registered 130 orders, with a total value of $335 million. 
Ten countries have signed up for capacity building and supply chain management 
assistance. 
Id. 
 44. See THE GLOBAL FUND, GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL FUND’S POLICIES ON 
PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT 12 (2009), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/psm/pp_guidelines_procurement_supply
management_en.pdf (“All procurement of pharmaceutical products to treat 
multidrug resistant TB (tuberculosis) must be conducted through the Green Light 
Committee . . . .”); see also Affordable Medicines Facility - malaria (AMFm), 
GLOBAL FUND, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/amfm/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) 
(describing the Affordable Medicines Facility – malaria, whose mission is to 
expand access to effective malaria treatment through innovative financing 
techniques that include tapping the public sector, private sector, and NGO’s). 
 45. See UNITAID, UNITAID CONST. § 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.unitaid.eu /images/governance/utd_constitution_05-07_en.pdf (relating 
that as part of the WHO, UNITAID’s express mission is to increase access to 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria medicines by leveraging price reductions for 
unaffordable treatments). 
 46. See Clinton Health Access Initiative - What We Do, CLINTON FOUND., 
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/what-we-do/clinton-health-access-initiative (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2011) (summarizing the goals and purpose of the Clinton Health 
Access Initiative, which include strengthening integrated health systems and 
expanding access to treatment for diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis). 
 47. See About Us, SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. SYS., http://scms.pfscm.org/scms/ 
about (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (recounting the mission and purpose of the Supply 
Chain Management System, which includes reducing the costs of essential 
medicines by encouraging its clients to buy in bulk and establishing long term 
contracts with manufactures). 
 48. See IDA FOUNDATION, http://ida.nl/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (describing 
the mission and purpose of the IDA Foundation, which include utilizing its 
resources to improve access to high quality medicines). 
 49. See Access to Essential Medicines: Ten Stories that Mattered in 2010, 
MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES/DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 29, 2010), 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cmf?id=4936&cat 
=special-report (outlining Médecins Sans Frontières’ drug procurement activities 
and vaccination campaigns). 
 50. See Supplies and Logistics, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/supply/index 
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access-to-medicines resources and activities will be considered 
intermediary services to third-party infringers whose medicines 
might inadvertently violate a fictional in-transit patent rule, or an 
opaque in-transit trademark confusion rule?51 Even further afield, 
could a drug regulatory authority that registered a generic medicine 
that later violated a fictional in-transit patent rule or an in-transit 
trademark confusion rule also have been held liable for intermediary-
service infringement?52 
Unfortunately, the switch to third-party enforcement, retained in 
the latest ACTA text, does little or nothing to allay the potential risks 
to access to generic medicines described above. One can still gather 
information about third parties with respect to means of production 
and distribution channels.53 One may still seek provisional orders and 
permanent injunctions against third parties to prevent infringing 
goods from entering channels of commerce, and in the case of 
provisional measures, also temporarily enjoin other alleged acts of 
infringement.54 Furthermore, the state may still impose criminal 
sanctions against those who aid and abet criminal infringement 
activities.55  
 
.html (last updated Nov. 8, 2010) (describing UNICEF’s procurement of $1.75 
billion worth of supplies from suppliers all over the world as an example of it 
fulfilling its mission to ensure quality supplies reach children and their families). 
 51. Cf. THE GLOBAL FUND, supra note 44, at 12 (detailing The Global Fund’s 
current requirements that recipients comply with “the policies of other 
international funding sources” with regard to procurement of pharmaceutical 
products). Ambiguity remains regarding possible new duties of the Global Fund to 
double-check and confirm the intellectual property status of medicines purchases it 
finances under international law (TRIPS Agreement), the law of the country of use, 
and the law of every transit country as a result of intermediary enforcement 
concerns. 
 52. See Effective Medicines Regulation: Ensuring Safety, Efficacy, and Quality, 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICINES (World Health Org., Geneva, Switz), Nov. 
2003, available at http://www.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4921e/s4921e.pdf 
(creating guidelines for drug regulatory authorities to assess medicines for quality, 
safety, and efficacy and approve the medicine for marketing within a country). By 
doing so, drug regulatory authorities would arguably enable the lawful distribution 
and sale of alleged IP infringing medicines and thus be subject to intermediary 
enforcement.  
 53. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 11. 
 54. Id. arts. 8, 12. 
 55. See id. art. 23.4 (allowing for criminal liability of those who aid and abet 
infringement activities). 
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In particular, many uncertainties exist in the meaning and scope of 
application of these provisions with respect to the concept of 
entrance into the channels of commerce. Distributors and 
transporters seem at particular risk as they may directly enable a 
territorial infringement by transporting the infringing product or 
content into the country of enforcement, thereby placing these 
products squarely in the middle of channels of commerce where 
territorial jurisdiction surely applies. Additionally, component 
suppliers might also be liable under the provisional measures 
provision since enjoining them as third parties could arguably 
prevent the offending product from being made in the first place.56 
Similarly, it is conceivable, though perhaps not as likely, that other 
enablers of commercialization, including procurement agents like 
Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Dispensary 
Association; funders like PEPFAR, the Global Fund, and UNITAID; 
and even drug regulatory authorities could also be temporarily 
enjoined to prevent the commercialization and distribution of alleged 
IP infringing products.57 Whether criminal “aiding and abetting” 
extends to suppliers of subsidiary materials and other enablers, who 
thereby contribute to either the production or commercialization of 
the offending products, is perhaps less clear, but the possibility of 
criminal liability58 is certainly troubling.  
It is clearly possible that APIs and even inert ingredients can be 
used in the manufacture of patent infringing products. Likewise, it is 
possible that non-patent-infringing medicines might be intentionally 
or misleadingly mislabeled so as to allegedly infringe a valid 
 
 56. See id. art. 12.1 (“Each Party shall provide that its judicial authorities have 
the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures . . . against a third 
party . . . to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right from 
occurring, and in particular, to prevent goods that involve the infringement of an 
intellectual property right from entering into the channels of commerce . . . .”). 
 57. See id. Third-party enforcement against these parties is less likely because 
their role in enabling an IP infringing product to enter the channels of commerce is 
much less direct than that of component suppliers, manufacturers, or distributors. 
Nonetheless, the ultimate commercialization and movement of the product would 
not occur were it not for their activities. A second reason that enforcement against 
these parties is less certain is that jurisdictional reach to extra-territorial activities is 
much less certain.   
 58. See id. art. 23.4 (authorizing criminal liability of those who aid and abet 
infringement activities). 
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trademark.59 In these circumstances and under TRIPS and 
conforming national law, the right holder ordinarily would have full 
recourse against the infringer in the country of manufacture and/or 
the country of marketing and use.60 However, imposing a second tier 
of liability on third-party suppliers and distributors who often lack 
knowledge of the IP status of the product at issue is an undesirable 
outcome. This second tier of liability would clog the channels of 
commerce by requiring suppliers and shippers to double-check the 
patent and eventual trademark status of all of their customers. In such 
circumstances, suppliers and shippers might choose to boycott 
generic manufacturers altogether rather than risk civil and perhaps 
even criminal sanctions.  
Certainly ACTA’s impact on access to medicines will be greatest 
if its civil enforcement measures are used with respect to alleged 
patent infringement. Health advocates therefore scored a victory 
when the parties to the ACTA draft amended the border measures 
provision to totally exclude patents and protection of undisclosed 
information.61 Unfortunately, this exclusion does not prevent ACTA 
members from unilaterally adopting patent-related border measures 
such as those currently codified in EC 1383/2003.62 And in contrast 
to ACTA’s border measures section, the civil enforcement section 
stipulates that “[a] Party may exclude patents and protection of 
undisclosed information from the scope of this [civil enforcement] 
Section.”63 This permission to exclude leaves patents within ACTA’s 
 
 59. See generally Letter from Peter Maybarduk, Staff Attorney, Essential 
Action, to Consultations and Liason Division, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 6 (July 2, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/frn_ 
comments/EssentialAction.pdf (explaining that deliberately mislabeled medicines 
are within a subset of trademark infringing medicines which pose a risk to public 
health). 
 60. See TRIPS pt. III, § 2 (outlining specific civil and administrative 
procedures and remedies available to the IP right holder in a member’s 
jurisdiction). 
 61. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 13 n.6 (excluding patents 
from the scope of Article 13). 
 62. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, supra note 12 (authorizing the 
detention of goods suspected of infringement on IP rights); supra notes 11-12 and 
accompanying text. 
 63. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 6-7 n.2 (updating the text 
from previous drafts, which read: “For the purpose of this Agreement, Parties 
agree that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section”). 
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mandatory civil enforcement rules unless a country actively chooses 
to exclude. This presumptive inclusion could exert subtle pressure on 
countries to include protection for patents and undisclosed data. The 
presumption could also be the basis of pressure by powerful trade 
partners for civil enforcement measures that extend to patents and 
thus more directly threaten trade in generic medicines. 
Moreover, ACTA will still allow border/customs enforcement 
procedures by right holders and ex-officio at export, in-transit, and 
import borders with respect to alleged trademark and copyright 
claims.64 Patent-related seizures had previously been made based on 
the in-country manufacturing fiction.65 Obviously these seizures 
could have implicated third parties had ACTA’s border measures 
provision not been changed to exclude patents.66 Although 
trademark-related seizures have been fewer,67 a third-party API 
supplier, procurement service, or shipper, could still be alleged to 
have contributed to an eventual product that was misleadingly or 
confusingly labeled. One plausible ground for mistaken assessment 
of confusion might arise from the fact that both a brand name and 
generic drug will display the required international non-proprietary 
name (“INN”) for the active ingredient. Likewise, both the brand 
name holder and the generic company might use portions of the INN 
in their own brand names. In these circumstances, allegations of 
actionable trademark confusion and of third-party liability could 
arise. Similarly, to avoid confusion for consumers and to maintain 
bioequivalence,68 the trade dress of a branded and generic medicine 
 
 64. See id. art. 13, n.6. 
 65. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member 
State -- Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010) 
(requesting consultations over multiple European seizures of in-transit generic 
medicines on alleged patent grounds, especially in the Netherlands, including one 
case where AIDS medicines purchased by UNITAID were being shipped from 
India to Nigeria). 
 66. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 13 n.6. 
 67. See, e.g, Press Release, Health Action Int’l, Another Seizure of Generic 
Medicines Destined for a Developing Country, This Time in Frankfurt (Jun. 5, 
2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/june-5-press-
release-frankfurt-seizure.pdf (recounting an in-transit seizure by German customs 
officials of generic Amoxicillin, en route from India to the Republic of Vanuatu, 
because of alleged trademark confusion with GlaxoSmithKline’s off-patent brand 
name medicine “Amoxil”). 
 68. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
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might also be appropriately similar but still trade-dress confusing.69 
Once again, third parties might be held liable even under border 
measures limited to trademark and copyright violations. Moreover, in 
the unlikely event the trademark issue rose to the level of willful 
trademark counterfeiting on a commercial scale, actions of third-
party suppliers and distributors could constitute criminal aiding and 
abetting. An innocent supplier for a producer, who later turned out to 
be a willful counterfeiter, could suddenly be deemed a criminal 
offender under Article 23.4 of ACTA.70 
III. ACTA NEGOTIATORS ARE PURSUING 
PHRMA’S ENFORCEMENT GOALS BOTH IN ACTA 
AND IN TRADE AGREEMENTS 
The European Commission, when releasing the April 
Predecisional Draft, asserted that “ACTA will not hamper access to 
generic medicines.”71 However, the analysis above shows otherwise. 
Underlying health advocates’ fears, the Pharmaceutical Research and 
 
STATISTICAL APPROACHES TO ESTABLISHING BIOEQUIVALENCE 2-4 (2001), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm070244.pdf. Medicines are said to be 
bioequivalent if generic versions have the same mode of administration (e.g., oral 
capsule or tablet) and the same rate of absorption and elimination of the active 
ingredient(s) in the human body as the original, previously registered product. 
Bioequivalence tests merely require a so-called crossover study, involving a 
relatively small number of human subjects, instead of the expense and delay of 
duplicative Phase I-III clinical trials. Id. Because the size and shape of a medicine 
can affect the bioequivalence of a generic medicine with its comparator, generic 
manufacturers often need to make their medicine’s trade dress (appearance) close 
to that of the originator. Although generic manufacturers should never affix a 
trademark or to stamp a pill with the originator’s brand, the overall similarity of 
appearance might reasonably confuse a customs agent.  
 69. See Sean Flynn, Note on ACTA and Access to Medicines, AM. U. WASH. C. 
L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP., http://www.wcl.american.edu/ 
pijip/go/blog-post/note-on-acta-and-access-to-medicines (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) 
(noting trademark confusion can occur when generic drugs are required to make 
their labeling similar to brand name drugs). 
 70. See ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 1, art. 23.4 (stating each party 
shall ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting exists for certain 
instances of trademark counterfeiting). 
 71. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n Directorate Gen. for Trade, Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: European Commission Welcomes Release of 
Negotiation Documents (Apr. 21, 2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/ 
index.cfm?id=552. 
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Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) advocates an even more 
extreme and precisely defined application. In PhRMA’s comments to 
the USTR on ACTA in 2008, PhRMA suggested that the Agreement 
should explicitly impose intermediary liability on Internet Service 
Providers and other operators, on entities that engage in parallel 
trade, on suppliers of APIs and other bulk pharmaceutical 
ingredients, and on distributors of generic medicines.  
1. PhRMA Recommendation: Establish liability for Internet Service 
Providers and Other Operators that Facilitate Trade in Counterfeit 
Medical Products. “Expressly prohibit online activities that directly or 
indirectly facilitate trade in counterfeit medical products and provide 
legal incentives for ISPs and online intermediaries to cooperate with 
legitimate manufacturers in combating counterfeiting activities. . . . We 
note that Korea recently implemented a system for taking down web sites 
selling counterfeits, and recommend examination of that system for 
possible adaptation and use in other countries to combat online 
counterfeit medicines.” 
2. PhRMA Recommendation: Provide Effective Border Enforcement 
against the Importation and Exportation of Counterfeit Medical Products. 
“[W]ithout effective controls against diversion, parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals becomes a potential pathway for the introduction of 
counterfeit medical products. ACTA members should also be required to 
prohibit the distribution of medical products diverted from legitimate 
distribution channels and such distribution of diverted products should be 
treated as a counterfeiting offense.” 
3. PhRMA Recommendation: Ensure that criminal and administrative 
remedies extend to all upstream and downstream links in the drug 
counterfeiting channel, including the supply of unauthorized bulk 
chemicals and the distribution of finished counterfeit products. “Effective 
anti-counterfeiting enforcement depends critically upon law 
enforcement’s ability to block so-called chokepoints in the counterfeiting 
manufacture and distribution channel, from the upstream supply of raw 
materials to the downstream distribution of finished products. In the case 
of counterfeit medical products, this holistic approach to enforcement 
necessitates effective enforcement tools and remedies to stop the 
unauthorized manufacture and supply (both domestic and international) 
of the bulk chemicals used to produce counterfeit medical products, as 
well as measures to prevent the unauthorized wholesale and retail 
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distribution of counterfeit products.”72 
Equally troubling is the fact that the U.S. and E.C. will not stop 
with ACTA on their press for third-party enforcement; even before 
ACTA, they enacted provisions requiring enforcement measures 
against third parties. For example, in the EU/Colombia/Peru 
Economic Partnership Agreement,73 there is an article on provisional 
and precautionary measures, Article 232, that states: “Parties shall 
provide that the judicial authorities may, at the request of the 
applicant issue an interlocutory injunction against any party intended 
to prevent any imminent infringement . . . .”74 Even more 
problematic is Article 234’s footnote 64, which provides that 
injunctions may be applied “against those whose services have been 
used to infringe intellectual property rights to the extent they have 
been involved in the process.”75 The meaning of “involved in the 
process” is remarkably imprecise. Pursuant to the preceding analysis, 
does it mean that an NGO buying allegedly infringing medicines will 
not be able to deliver the medicines to its patients, or that a drug 
regulatory authority can be enjoined from registering a medicine? 
CONCLUSION 
PhRMA and its ACTA negotiating surrogates have vigorous 
ambitions that ACTA and other enforcement treaties be applied 
upstream and downstream to manufacturing, supply, and distribution 
channels to stop parallel and generic trade in medicines. Their tools 
of preference include broad inclusion of IP rights, border/in-transit 
measures, and ubiquitous injunctions that might interfere with 
government use licenses and judicially-granted royalty schemes. Yet, 
 
 72. James Love, PhRMA Comments on ACTA: ISP Liability, Parallel Trade 
and Generic APIs, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Jul. 10, 2008, 10:00 PM), 
http://keionline.org/node/73. 
 73. Trade Agreement Between the European Union [and its Member States] 
and Colombia and Peru, art. 232, initialed Mar. 23-24, 2011, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=691 (follow “Preamble and 
text of the agreement” hyperlink). 
 74. Id. art. 232 (emphasis added). This article could potentially be used against 
NGOs or international medicines programs trying to deliver generics. However, 
this possibility depends upon national legislation providing it, since the article 
starts by saying “in accordance with their domestic legislation.” Id. States therefore 
preserve their margin of maneuver. 
 75. See id. art. 234 n.64. 
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PhRMA and its captive trade negotiators also want to use third-party 
enforcement measures to dampen generic trade. The dangers to third 
parties under ACTA are not limited to ISPs. Rather, the danger 
extends to all who contribute to the supply, manufacture, registration, 
procurement, and distribution of generic medicines that must go 
through the choke-points of international trade, where ephemeral and 
fictional patent and trademark-confusion rights might prevent the 
cross-border trade of medicines lawfully produced in the country of 
export and lawfully consumed in the country of import.  
Although it is too late to stop the ACTA juggernaut, which has 
reached its final stages,76 residual opportunities exist at the national 
level to challenge the agreement substantively and procedurally. 
Even if ACTA comes into force and is enacted in particular 
countries, much can be done to exclude its application to patents and 
undisclosed data, to corral its interpretation to minimize the reach of 
third-party enforcement, to narrowly construe its jurisdictional grant, 
to strictly define “entering into the channels of commerce,” and to 
limit aider and abettor criminal liability. Health advocates must join 
forces internationally to eliminate or reduce the risks to access to 
medicines codified in the proposed ACTA text. Advocates can still 
try to forestall ACTA’s approval at the national level and to narrow 
and ameliorate provisions in implementing legislation that could 
adversely impact supplier, distributors and enablers of generic trade 
in low-cost generic medicines of assured quality. 
However, the risk of intermediary service provider and third-party 
enforcement efforts is not limited to ACTA itself. The E.C. is on 
record that it hopes that ACTA will be adopted by other countries 
"facing the same counterfeiting and piracy problems."77  Even more 
ominously, although the mandatory application of enhanced 
enforcement measures against patent- and data-infringing products 
 
 76. See ACTA Countries Finalize Agreement, Adopt U.S.-EU Compromise, 28 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 23073528 
(confirming ACTA members have finalized the ACTA text and had resolved all 
left over issues from the September round of negotiations); EU Parliament ACTA 
Resolution Opens Doors to Final Approval, 28 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 3, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 24009637 (reporting the passage of the non-binding 
resolution by a 331-294 vote of the European Union parliamentarians). 
77.  Intellectual Property: Anti-Counterfeiting, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-
property/anti-counterfeiting/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
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was avoided in ACTA, PhRMA's intentions in this regard are clear.  
Likewise, in bilateral trade agreements and Special 301 Watch List 
annual reports, there remain many opportunities for the hydra-like 
reappearance of full-blown intermediary or third-party enforcement.  
Accordingly, advocates must maintain vigilance for a significant 
time to come if these enforcement-related dangers to access to 
legitimate generic medicines are to be avoided. 
 
